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Abstract
Mathematical programming results revealed that moving toward more flexible agricultural
policies would generate substantial economic and environmental gains in a North Carolina
diversified cropping region, But in a Washington-Idaho dryland grains region, only the use of
relatively new and sometimes problematic alternative cropping systems permitted environmental and
economic gains under policy reform. In both regions, a recoupling policy, which links government
payments to resource-conserving farming practices, was needed to protect environmental quality
when market prices for program crops were high.
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Introduction
Agriculturally-related human health and
environmental impacts have become increasingly
important in the agricultural policy debate.
Research on environmental and economic tradeoffs
of production practices for a variety of crops,
chemicals, climates, and regions is needed to inform
the 1995 and subsequent Farm Bill debates on
issues related to protection of human health, natural
resources, and farm income.
Estimates of aggregate economic effects of
agrichemical restrictions vary in magnitude and
direction for different regions of the country (Taylor
et al.). Environmental costs (benefits) associated
with agrichemical pollution (abatement) differ by
region as well. For example, in a contingent
valuation study of willingness to pay for
groundwater protection in a region with high
pesticide contamination potential, willingness to pay
was significantly correlated with the likelihood of
groundwater contamination (Sun et al.). Thus,
smaller benefits of groundwater protection would be
expected in areas with low contamination potential,
and also in less populated areas.
Studies have predicted that the South would
be more adversely affected by national pesticide
bans than other regions due to higher pest pressures
(Taylor et al,; Richardson et al.). Foster attributes
these results to insufficient modeling of substitution
possibilities. The long growing season and
moderate climate in the South might make adapting
to chemical restrictions easier because more crop
options are available. With respect to restrictions
on inorganic nitrogen, the South has an advantage
over cooler climates because green manure crops
can be double-cropped with cash crops.
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Various studies have addressed the impacts
of alternative policies on the private profitability of
alternative and conventional production systems
(Dobbs and Becker; Duffy and Chase; Faeth et al.),
Few studies address broader measures such as
impacts on the natural resource base, changes in
taxpayer cost, and impacts on returns to land. As
social scientists, we need to develop a more
complete framework for evaluating the
environmental and economic performance of the
agricultural sector. While Faeth et al. presented a
comprehensive natural resource accounting
frdmework including erosion damage and farm
subsidy costs, the study did not address impacts on
groundwater quality. Moreover, the EPIC model
Faeth et al. used for calculating erosion levels may
not always perform well in new regions. This study
uses hydrologic models to calculate relative leaching
potential of different cropping systems and an
erosion model (RUSLE) which has been calibrated
for the region under study.
In this study, a large number of
conventional as well as resource conserving
cropping options were studied for rcpresentatlvc
farms in two contrasting farming regions, the North
Carolina Coastal Plain and the Washington-Idaho
Palouse. These two important production regions
lie outside the Great Plains and Corn Belt regions,
where much analysis has been done (Faeth et al.,
Dobbs and Becker, Lockeretz et al., Duffy and
Chase, National Research Council). These two
regions also represent contrasting environmental
problems, climates, and population densities.
Farm-level, mixed integer programming
models were used to project profit-maximizing farm
manager behavior under a variety of farm policy
scenarios (Painter). Crop prices prevailing under
each policy scenario were estimated from a survey
of agricultural sector modelers and outlook
specialists. Agrichemical Icaching and soil erosion
were estimated using physical models that account
for management practices, climate, and topography,
Environmental and economic impacts for each
policy scenario were calculated from the profit-
maximizing cropping choices. Specifically, the
impacts of profit-maxirnizing behavior by farm
managers on farm profit, taxpayer cost in terms of
government payments to farmers, erosion damage,
and agrichemical leaching were estimated. Results
were assessed both with and without rcsource-
conserving cropping systems.
Assigning dollar values to environmental
damage estimates in order to obtain a more
comprehensive measure of policy impacts is
difficult. Erosion-induced economic damage, both
on-site and off-site, are determined for all
production systems in the highly erodible Palouse
region using documented measurement methods, As
economic damage estimates from predicted
agrichemical leaching rates are not available,
physical leaching estimates are presented for each
crop production system in the Coastal Plain region.
Aggregate Versus Farm-Level Approaches
The choice between national modeling and
farm-level analysis in policy evaluation involves
major tradeoffs. Aggregate modelers have
measured selected components of social welfare
using a variety of approaches (for example, see
Smith et al.; Hertel; Langley et al; Tobey and
Reinert). All aggregate studies suffer fundamental
weaknesses related to the gross aggregation of
production regions and lack of specificity in utilized
data. The relationships in aggregate models are
often based on historical data generated under
policies and technologies different from the ex ante
policies being modeled. Multiregional programming
models typically include a limited activity set
compared to actual practices. Environmental
impacts are especially difficult to aggregate as they
tend to be site-specific, varying by soil type,
climate, hydrology, and human and wildlife
population densities.
On the other hand, single-region, farm-level
studies of the impacts of agricultural policies are
rarely convincing. Cropping patterns, environmental
vulnerabilities, and fro-m and community economic
structure vary greatly from region to region. As a
compromise, this study estimates detailed farm-level
impacts of agricultural policies in two dissimilar
regions using a uniform methodology and estimates
of national prices by policy.
Methods
Mixed integer programming (MIP) models
were developed for six policy scenarios (Figure I).J Agr. and Applied Ecorr , December, 1994 453
Figure 1. Policy Scenarios Modeled for Representative Farms in Both Study Regions.
1990 FARM BILL: Farmers receive deficiency payments based on the difference between
legislated target prices and average market prices for program commodities. In return, they must
“set-aside” a certain portion of their historical base acreage for these commodkies. 1990
provisions require famlers to forgo deficiency payments on an additioml 15% of their crop
acreage bases (”flex acres”). They may plant program crops, oilseeds, and specified nonprogracn
crops on “flex acres” while preserving base and yield history. Participating farmers also must
comply with provisiom protecting erodible land and wetlands enacted in the 1985 Farm Bill.
Quota programs (dairy, peanuts, tobacco, etc.) wonld be continued unchanged in this and all other
scemrios.
40% FLEX In this scenario, the “flex acres” in the 1990 Farm Bill are increased to 40%. All
other provisions remain identical.
ADMIN: The Bush Administration’s original proposal for the 1990 Farm Bill provided for a
whole farm base called the Nomlal Crop Acreage (NCA), which is the smn of the farms’
program crop acreage bases plus historical oilseed plantings. Deficiency payments are based on
historical program crop bases and yields. Basically, this represents 100% flexibility on base
acreage plantings excluding set-aside requirements which remain in effect. Flex provisions are
~ included in this scenario,
DECUP: Farmers freely choose crops and farming practices while receiving amrral lump sum
payments eqnal to their average historical payment levels.
RECUft Farmers collect subsitles based on estimated erosion reduction in the Palouse and on
reduction of agrichemical use in the Coastal Plain.
NO PROG: Commodity programs are termimted unilateral] y, Farmers receive no deficiency
payments or lump sum payments for programs crop production.
These scenarios include the status quo 1990 Farm endogenized using zero-one integer variables. A
Bill, a version with increased mandatory flex
requirements (405%FLEA’),a scenario with complete
base flexibility modeled on the Bush
Administration’s 1990 proposal (,4fM4fN), a
scenario in which government payments are based
on historical levels and there are no planting
restrictions (DECUP), a scenario with payments
based on environmental criteria (RECUP), and a
scenario with no government programs (NO PROG).
MIP is useful for identifying profit-maximizing
combinations of crop rotations subject to economic
and physical constraints including crop prices,
production costs, farm program rules, and resource
endowments (Perry et al.). Binary farm program
participation decisions and accompanying binary
environmental and production restrictions are
sample MIP formulation for the 1990 Farm Bill in
the North Carolina study area is available upon
request from the authors. Detailed formulations for
all policy scenarios are available in Painter.
The MIP models determine the profit-
maximizing choice of cropping systems for the farm
manager on each representative farm. In North
Carolina, the representative Coastal Plain farm was
developed using Census of Agriculture data (U.S.
Dept. of Commerce) and advice from local
Extension specialists, This 400-acre farm has a 40-
acre tobacco allottrncnt, 180 acres of corn base, and
120 acres of wheat base. Generally, a farm in this
area would rotate corn with double-cropped
wheatlsoybeans and tobacco. Yield data were454 Painier and Young: Environmental and Economic lmpact,r of Agricultural Policy Rejorm
obtained from Census of Agriculture data. In
Washington, the representative Palouse farm was
constructed using survey data (Halvorson), as the
study area comprises just one portion of a county.
This 1275-acre dryland grain farm has 46 percent of
the land in wheat base acreage and 21 percent in
barley base. Base and yield data were obtained
from Halvorson. Set-aside rates of 7 percent for
wheat and 7.5 percent for corn and barley were used
in this study, based on 1991-95 projections (Food
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute).
Average indust~-wide prices for program
crops over the 1991-95 projection horizon were
calculated as the mean response of a survey of
agricultural outlook and policy specialists (Table 1).
Market prices were predicted to be lower when set-
aside programs were discontinued, such as for the
No Programs and Decoupling scenarios. Policy
scenarios which allowed more crop choice
flexibility tended to increase price projections for
wheat and corn, and decrease price projections for
soybeans. In general, predicted price variation over
policy scenarios was modest, possibly due to the
assumption of unilateral changes in U.S. policy.
In the MIP models, net returns over total
costs are maximized for each policy scenario. The
land cost, either share-cropping (Palouse) or cash
rent (Coastal Plain), represents an actual cost if
farmland is rented or an opportunity cost if it is
owned. Potential environmental damage, taxpayer
cost, and returns to land are calculated from the
profit-maximizing outcome. Policy impacts for
farm managers and landowners are tallied
separately. Almost two-thirds of the land in the
Washington-Idaho study region and over one-half in
the North Carolina study region is rented. Under
share-cropping, farm policies may affect farm
operators differently than landlords. ‘raxpaycr costs
include deficiency payments and decoupled or
recoupled payments. Administrative costs and
social welfare opportunity costs of financing
government farm programs are not included due to
a lack of information. Estimates of the direct social
opportunity costs of subsidy payments vary widely,
but might range from 20 percent to 50 percent of
the subsidy itself (Alston and Hurd, p. 149).
Envmonmental impacts measured in this study
include on-site and off-site soil erosion damage
estimates and agrichemical leaching estimates for all
agrichemicals used in both study areas.
In the three-county North Carolina Coastal
Plain study region (Pitt, Wayne, and Greene
Counties), less than 2 percent of the land is
classified as highly erodible compared to 88 percent
of the land in the Washington-Idaho Pa}ouse study
region. No erosion damage was calculated for
cropping systems in the North Carolina Coastal
Plain due to the small percentage of highly erodible
land. An off-site soil erosion damage value of
$3.14 (1991 dollars) per ton of soil eroded is used
for the Palouse study area based on Ribaudo’s
estimate for the Pacific region. Ribaudo includes
estimates of damage from siltation in roadside
ditches, flooding attributable to siltation, costs of
dredging hydroelectric reservoirs and navigation
channels, destruction of fish habitat, declining
quality of recreation areas, and other water
degradation effects.
On-site soiI erosion damage estimates in
the Palouse were calculated applying present value
analysis to estimated functions which measure the
effect of topsoil loss on current and future yields for
wheat, barley, and peas (Walker and Young). A 4
percent real private rate of discount and a 75-year
time horizon were used. This captures 95 percent
of the present value of erosion damage into
perpetuity. Topsoil depth is used as a proxy for soil
properties such as organic matter content and bulk
density that are correlated with topsoil depth and in
turn with crop yields. On-site erosion damage by
topsoil depth was weighted by the relative frequency
of different depths in the study area.
Agrichem~cal leaching in both study areas
was estimated using an attenuation factor method
which accounts for differences in soil, climate, and
agrichemical properties. The attenuation factor is a
process oriented index which is useful for ranking
the relative leaching potential of a solute under
different management scenarios in a given area
(Khan and Liang, 1989). The relative risk for
leaching of agrichemicals was estimated as follows:
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‘t’able1. Natioml Average Farm Level Price Predlctiorrs (Dollars per Bushel) by Crop for 1991-95 Under Six Policy Scenarios,
Corn Soybeans Wheat
Policy
Mean Std. Dev, Mean Std, Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1990 Farm Bill 2.24 0.25 5.85 0.51 3.05 0.26
1990 Farru Bill, 40% Flex 2,28 0,24 5.85 0.55 3.08 0.23
Administration Proposal 2.27 0.26 5,69 0.52 3.09 0.16
Decoupling 2.14 0.21 5.67 0.45 2.99 0.29
Recoupling 2.20 0.21 5.85 0.41 3,06 0.26
No Programs 2.17 0.21 5.63 0.48 3.04 0.42
SOURCE: Paiuter and Young.
where L is depth to groundwater and R is the
chemical retention factor, a measure of chemical
adsorption in soil calculated from organic carbon
partition coefficients and organic carbon content of
soil. 9 is field capacity soil water content, q is
average daily net infiltration, and T,,z is the
pesticide degradation half-life, a measure of
pesticide persistence in soil. For nitrate-nitrogen,
T,,J is adjusted to reflect losses in mobile nitrogen
due to plant uptake, vitrification, and
immobilization. A depth to groundwater value of
5.00 meters was chosen, as low water table levels
range from 4,5 to 6 meters in the North Carolina
Coastal Plain, which is the more vulnerable of the
two study areas to agrichemical leaching (USDA,
1980; USDA, 1974a; USDA, 1974b). Fertilizer
nitrate-nitrogen (NO,J - N) and, to a lesser extent,
Banvel herbicide were predicted to be highly likely
to leach beyond a soil depth of five meters. ] In the
Palouse study region, virtually no agrichemicals
were predicted to leach beyond a depth of five
meters. Relatively high water tables, higher rainfall,
and sandier soils result in a much higher potential
for water quality damage in the North Carolina
Coastal Plain. In addition, rural population density
is 12 times higher in this region, which indicates a
greater human threat from polluted groundwater.
In the North Carolina Coastal Plain, three
resource-conserving cropping systems are modeled:
low-input corn, low-input corn preceded by an
Austrian winter peas cover crop, and low-input corn
preceded by a vetch cover crop. Conventional
systems in the North Carolina study region include
conventionally tilled corn, no-till corn, soybeans,
double-cropped winter wheat and no-till soybeans,
wheat, and tobacco. In the Palouse, alternative
cropping systems include a grain-rapeseed rotation,
a wheat-dry pea-unharvested legume rotation, a
wheat-barley-green manure clover rotation, and a
bluegrass-lentil-small grains rotation. These
alternative systems do have some limitations for use
on a commercial basis: fluctuating grass seed and
rapeseed markets can make those rotations
unprofitable, and agronomic problems have been
associated with the green manure and unharvested
legume crops. Conventional systems for this region
include wheat-dry peas and wheat-barley-dry peas.
Results: North Carolina Coastal Plain
Tables 2 and 3 present policy-induced
economic and environmental impacts for both
regions when returns to management are maximized
using expected 1991-95 prices. Returns to
management in column (1) of Tables 2 and 3 reflect
the optimal solutions to the MIP models converted
to a per acre basis. The remaining columns
represent post-optimization calculations for these
solutions.
In the North Carolina Coastal Plain, policy
reform could achieve substantial economic and
environmental gains as measured in this study
(Table 2). Recoupling (RECUP) increases returns
to managementby$21 /acre over the 1990 Farm Bill
(1990 FB) with alternative crops and by $34/acre
when alternative crops are excluded (see column
(1)). Returns to management are also increased, to
a lesser extent, under the 1990 Administration
Proposal (ADIWIN) and Decoupling (DECUP). A
small decline in returns to management occurs
under the 1990 Farm Bill plus 40°/0 Flex (40%
FLEX). Under No Programs (NO PROG), returns456 Painter and Young: Environmental ond Economic Impacts oj Agricultural Policy R@-m
Table2. PredictedAverageEconomicandEnvironmental IndicatorsWberrMaximizing Returns to
Management by Pohcy Scenario, 1991-95 Expected Prices, North Carolim Coastal Plain.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Returns to Returns to Taxpayer Nitrogen
Management Land cost Leaching
Policy/Rotations Available ($/ac/yr) ($laclyr) ($/ac/yr) (lbs/ac/yr)
1, 1990 Farm Bill
a. All Rotations 36 110 22 54
b. No AIL Rotations 23 110 22 91
2. 1990 Farm Bill, 40% Flex
a. All Rotations 31 110 14 51
b. NO AIt. Rotations 21 110 6 24
3. 1990 Admin. Proposal
a. AH Rotations 52 110 26 27
b, No Alt. Rotations 41 1Lo 24 6
4. Decoupling
a. All Rotations 41 110 22 29
b. No Alt. Rotatious 34 110 22 6
5. Recoupling
a, AH Rotatiom 57 110 39 6
b. No AIL Rotations 5’1 110 39 6
6. No Programs
a. AH Rotations 15 110 0 29
b. No Alt. Rotations 11 110 0 6
Table 3 Predmed Average Econom!c and Enwronmental hrdlcators When Maximizmg Returns to Managment by Policy Scenano, 199 I -95 Expected Prices,
Washmgton-[daho Paiouse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Policy/Rotat]ons Available Returns Returns Tax- Eros[on Off-site On-sw
to to payer Rate ErosIon Erosmn
Management Land cost Damage
($laclyr)
Damage
— ($laclyr) ($laclyr) (tlaclyr) ($/ac/yr) ($laclyr)
1 1990 Fm’rrI Btll
a All Rotatmns 6 53 23 56 140
b No All Rotations -6 61 23 61 151
2 1990 Farm BIll,400A Flex
a All Rotat]ons 2 46 15 41 101
b No Ah Rotations -8 5s 16 61 151
3 1990 Admm
a Al i Rotat[ons II 52 28 53 13 I
b No Ah Rotatmns I 57 28 65 162
4 Decoupling
a All Rotatmns 5 43 23 21 52
b No Alt Rotations -1 6[ 23 63 155
5 Recoupbng
a All Rotimorrs 15 43 36 21 52
b No Alt Rotaoons -5 61 23 63 15.5
6 No Programs
a Al I Rotatmns -9 36 0 21 52
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to management are approximately half of those
under 1990 FB. Short-run returns to land are not
impacted by these policy provisions, as cash rent
dominates in the North Carolina study region. In
terms of taxpayer cost, measured as government
payments to farmers, outlays are $17/acre. higher
under RECUP than under 1990 FB, Government
payments are $2-$4/acre higher under ADMIN than
under 1990 FB. Tdxpayer cost declines relative to
1990 FB under the remaining scenarios.
When alternative crops are not available,
nitrogen leaching is estimated at just 6 lbs/acre/year
under ADMIN, DECUP, RECUP, and NO PROG,
compared to 91 Ibslacrelyear under 1990 FB.
Complete planting flexibility encourages profitable
soybean production. Under these alternative
policies, North Carolina Coastal Plain farmers no
longer plant relatively unprofitable corn and wheat
in response to government payments. Since wheat
and corn are high nitrogen users, the potential for
environmental damage from nitrogen leachate
declines.
Paradoxically, environmental damage as
measured by the nitrogen leaching estimates is
predicted to be higher for the Coastal Plain when
alternative rotations are available than when they
are excluded, except under 1990 FB. This result
can be explained by the profit-maximizing choice
when alternative rotations are available: low-input
corn preceded by a nitrogen-fixing cover crop.
When alternative rotations are not available, profit-
maximizing farmers replace corn with soybeans
under scenarios with increased planting flexibility.
While the low-input corn with a cover crop is
predicted to leach just 43 percent of the fertilizer
nitrate-nitrogen of conventionally grown corn, this
amount of leaching still exceeds the level predicted
for soybeans,
RECUP and ADMIN are predicted to have
the highest policy-induced gains in economic and
environmental indicators, both with and without
alternative crops, in the Coastal Plain study region.
RECUP is more costly to taxpayers than ADMIN,
however. Low nitrogen leaching both with and
without alternative crops is achieved only under
RECUP, where farmer incentives are tied to
reduction of nitrogen and Banvel use. Under
ADMIN, complete base flexibility allows soybean
production on wheat and corn bases. Since
soybeans do not require nitrogen or Banvel, ADMIN
performs well based on the environmental criteria in
this study. Evidence that intensive soybean
production is increasing in the South is provided by
1987 Natural Resource Inventory data which
revealed that over 70 percent of southern farmers
planning to plant soybeans were doing so on land
that had been previously cropped to soybeans in at
least two of the previous three years (Ikerd).
Price sensitivity WdS examined by
increasing market prices for corn, wheat, and barley
to target prices. In the North Carolina study region,
only RECUP produced low leaching estimates under
the assumption of strong world grain markets (Table
4). Under other policy scenarios, profit-maximizing
farmers exit the government program to plant
intensive grain rotations, which increases nitrogen
leaching. By including modest taxpayer
expenditures for agrichemical use reductions,
RECUP was able to substantially reduce
environmental damage,
Results: Washington-Idaho Palouse
In the Washington-Idaho Palouse, returns
to management also increase under RECUP and
ADMIN and decline under 40% FLEX and NO
PROG (Table 3). Under DECUP, returns increase
only when no alternative rotations are available.
However, in this region of fewer profitable crop
alternatives, less dramatic change is achieved with
policy reform. Returns to land show that alternative
rotations yield lower profits to landlords. Several of
the alternative rotations include green manure crops
which yield no immediate crop share for landlords.
Under current farm program provisions, program
crops yield lucrative deficiency payments which are
split with landlords along with the crop share.
Conventional rotations have a higher concentration
of these program crops. The immediate decline in
landlord’s share under many alternative rotations
may be a barrier to greater use of alternative
rotations.
As in the North Carolina study area,
RECUP has the highest taxpayer cost in the Palousc
when all rotations are available (Table 3). When
alternative rotations are excluded, only ADA4/iVhas
slightly higher tax cost than 1990 FB as the flex458 Painter and Young: Environmental and Economic Inrpacn of Agricultural Poltcy Reform
Table 4. Predicted Average Economic and Environmental Indicators when Maximizing Returns to
Management by Policy Scenario, Program Crop Prices Set Equal to Target Prices, North Carolina
Coastal Plain.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Returns Returns Tax- Nitrogen
to to payer Leaching
Mamgement Land cost
Policy/Rotations Available ($laclyr) ($laclyr) ($laclyr) (lbs/ac/yr)
1. 1990 Farm Bill
a. All Rotations 51 110 0 74
b. NO Alt. Rotations 42 110 0 107
2. 1990 Farm Bill, 40% Flex
a. All Rotations 54 110 0 74
b. No Alt. Rotatiorw 43 110 0 107
3. 1990 Admin. Proposal
a. All Rotations 52 110 0 77
b. No Alt. Rotations 39 110 0 114
4, Decoupling
a. All Roratiom 67 110 22 74
b, No Alt. Rotations 59 110 22 107
5. Recoupling
a. All Rotations 59 110 19 29
b. No Alt, Rotations 42 110 19 51
6. No Programs
a. All Rotations 48 110 0 74
b. No Alt. Rotations 40 110 0 107
provisions requiring 15 percent reduction in
deficiency payments are not enforced (Figure I).
Erosion increases slightly under ADMIN relative to
1990 FB; complete planting flexibility allows
planting of the most profitable and most erosive
crop, winter wheat. When profitable,
environmentally sound alternative rotations are
included in the model, erosion rates decline
substantially under alternative policy scenarios that
remove traditional farm program incentives favoring
winter wheat. Wheat/pea/green manure is the
optimal choice for 100 percent of the representative
farm under DECUP, RECUP, and NO PROG when
all rotations are included. Smaller percentages of
this soil conserving system are used under policies
with traditional farm program incentives.
Unfortunately, this rotation has had mixed success
afler the initial three years of successful field trials
(Goldstein); further work on this particular system
is needed before farmers can be expected to adopt
it.
For the Palouse region, both DECUP and
RECUP reduce erosion damage substantially when
alternative rotations are available (Table 3). Under
RECUP, farm managers would benefit at the
expense of taxpayers, as both returns to
management and taxpayer cost increase relative to
the 1990 FB. Under IJECUP, taxpayer cost is set
equal to that under 1990 FB by design (see Figure
I). Returns to land are $ 10/acre lower for both
DECUP and RECUP, however. The 40% FLEX
policy scenario reduces erosion by 1.5 tonslacrelyear
relative to 1990 FB when alternative rotations are
available and also reduces taxpayer outlays by
$81acre. Under this scenario, both returns to
management and returns to land decline somewhat
relative to /990 FB.
In both regions, taxpayer cost increased
most (relative to 1990 FB) under RECUP and
ADMIN, and, as would be predicted, fell under 40%
FLEX and NO PROG. Taxpayer cost is comprisedJ. Agr, and Applied Econ,, Decemhert 1994 459
of program crop deficiency payments under 1990
FB, 40% FLEX, and ADMIN. As specified earlier
for DECUP, the farm-wide subsidy is set equal to
that of 1990 FB (see Figure 1), but is not tied to
production decisions, The subsidy for RECUP is
based on average farm-wide environmental
performance, either erosion rate (Palouse) or
leaching of nitrate-nitrogen and Banvel (Coastal
Plain), and is targeted to reward “good”
environmental performance with subsidy levels
equal to those under 1990 FB.
As in the North Carolina study area, price
sensitivity analysis for the Palouse revealed that
RECUP had superior performance when crop prices
rose high enough to remove traditional incentives
for farm program participation (Table 5).
Conservation compliance provisions under 40%
FLEXand ADMIN provide environmental protection
only when farmers choose to participate, When
market prices rise above target prices, profit-
maximizing farmers exit the government program
and use profitable but erosive winter wheat systems.
Only RECUP, which pays farmers to reduce soil
erosion and nitrogen use, protected the environment
under high grain prices. It did so at high cost to
taxpayers, but associated reductions in
environmental damage and increases in farmer
profits more than offset the growth in taxpayer
expenditures.
Implications for Research and Policy
Projected impacts for the North Carolina
Coastal Plain and the Washington-Idaho Palouse
diverge considerably. Reformist policies were
projected to bring economic and environmental
gains without the availability of alternative crops in
the North Carolina study region. In the Palouse,
limited crop choice diminishes the potential for
economic and environmental gains using policy
reform alone. The development and transfer of
alternative crop rotations is vital to reducing
environmental damage in this region. In addition,
policy benefits need to be decoupled from wheat
production. Divergent regional impacts highlight
the importance of detailed evaluations of national
policies in different regions. Both economic and
environmental impacts of policies depend greatly on
site-specific land, climate, and farm structure
characteristics.
The robust projected performance of
RECUP in protecting the environment during
periods of high market prices highlights an
important policy choice for policymakers. If society
wants to avoid losing environmental gains during
periods of strong demand and high prices, farm
program payments based on environmental
performance rather than market price levels and
historical production of program crops should be
considered. However, the gains to farmers and
society from RECUP comes at increased cost to
taxpayers. Under average market prices, gradual
program elimination coupled with development of
sustainable technology may be more cost effective
in some regions. When world grain markets are
strong, results of this study show that environmental
degradation can be expected unless recoupled
programs are adopted. Congress will need to
balance the importance of budgetary reductions and
environmental protection. Regionally specific
environmentally recoupled policies might cost less
than policies with uniform national standards.
Further research and development to perfect
environmentally sound and profitable sustainable
farming technologies will improve the cost
effectiveness of recoupled policies.
The results of this study strongly suggest
that policy reform and technology development are
both important to achieve an economically and
environmentally sound agriculture. Policy reform
without simultaneous investment in the development
and extension of appropriate sustainable technology
will have limited payoff in regions like the Palouse
that lack profitable and environmentally sound
cropping alternatives. However, in areas similar to
the North Carolina Coastal Plain, policy reform
couId enhance economic and environmental
performance with currently available cropping
technology. Of course, caution should be exercised
in generalizing the results from these two regional
case studies nationally. Similar farm-level case
studies of policy impacts are needed for other
important production regions.460 Painter and Young, Envlrwmen{al and Economic lmpucts of Agricultural Policy Reform
Table 5. Predicted Average Economic and Enwronmcntal Indicators When Maximizing Returns to Management by Policy Scenario,
Program Crop Pnccs Set Equal to Target Prices, Washington-ldaho Palouse
“ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pol[cy/Rotations Available Returns Returns Tax- Erosion Off-site On-site
to 10 payer Rate Erosion Erosion
Management Land cost Damage
($laclyr)
Damage
($laclyr) ($laclyr) (tlacfyr) ($lactyr) ($laclyr)
I 1990 Farm Bill
a. All Rotations
b No Alt. Rotations
2. 1990 Farm BIII, 40% Flex
a. All Rotations
b No AIL Rotations
3. 1990 Admin. Proposal
a. All Rotations
b. No Alt. Rotations
4. Decoupling
a All Rotations
b No Alt. Rotations
5. Recoupling
a. All Rotations
b. No Alt. Rotations
6. No Programs
a All Rotations
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